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Abstract
In a decentralized supply chain, double marginalization is an important source of ine±ciency. We
suggest in this paper a simple mechanism to reduce it, that uses a wholesale price contract and rene-
gotiation. Our mechanism only requires repeated interaction, and rational behavior from the players.
Speci¯cally, over T rounds of negotiation, the supplier proposes di®erent prices in each round, and the
buyer places orders at the quoted price. Even though prices are decreasing in time, the buyer places a
positive order, to force the supplier to reduce its price in the following round. This interaction results
in higher pro¯ts for both supplier and buyer. We solve the buyer and supplier problems and show that,
as T increases, supply chain e±ciency tends to 100%, and the sub-optimality gap decreases with 1=T.
Finally, we discuss how these results can be applied to design negotiation processes.
1 Introduction
In the past years, supply chain management has emerged as one of the most important levers
for many companies to remain pro¯table. For example, Wal-Mart in the United States, Aldi in
Germany or Mercadona in Spain have achieved remarkable pro¯tability in retail, where margins
have traditionally been very low. Key to their success are supply chain management practices,
including logistics (cross-docking), demand management (every-day-low-prices) and supplier
partnering (strategic suppliers).
In many industries, as the number of components outsourced has increased, managing buyer-
supplier relationships e±ciently has become critical. One of sources of ine±ciency is known
as double marginalization. This phenomenon arises when two companies, working in the same
supply chain, optimize inventory levels and prices taking only its own bene¯t into account,
and thus create negative externalities for the other company. As a result, the supply chain
operates in a mode that is sub-optimal in the sense that additional pro¯t for the chain could
be created and shared between its ¯rms. Double marginalization has been studied extensively
in the literature. For instance, Lariviere and Porteus [10] show that, in a supply chain with a
manufacturer making to order and a retailer ordering to stock, the total stock in the supply
chain is lower than the one that maximizes the supply chain pro¯t. Indeed, the manufacturer
quotes a price larger than its true cost, and, as a result, the retailer orders less than what a
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1centralized chain would. This model can be extended to more general settings, and the resulting
behavior is similar.
Improvements countering double marginalization have been suggested, see Cachon [3] for an
extensive review. These improvements allow the supply chain to move from local optimization,
where each company takes decisions individually, considering only its own pro¯ts, towards global
optimization, where the decisions of all the companies take into account aggregated supply chain
pro¯ts. Typically, this is achieved by changing the incentives of the di®erent partners in the
supply chain, and aligning them towards a common goal, namely, maximizing supply chain
pro¯ts. Several solutions to the problem have been proposed and implemented. Despite wide
use, most of these solutions involve costly implementations. As we describe below, modifying
the "natural" incentive structure of the supply chain creates additional side-e®ect costs.
² Buy-back agreements, see Pasternack [13], allow buyers to return unsold merchandise to
the suppliers for a refund. This is extensively used in book distribution, where bookstores
can return unsold items to the published for a full refund. This practice pushes bookstores
to carry larger quantities of books than if they had to bear the inventory risk, i.e., the risk
of discarding the excess inventory at a loss at the end of the selling season. Newspaper
distributors use the same type of contract. In the case of newspapers, in order to receive
a refund for unsold items, distributors usually cut the ¯rst page of each newspaper, and
return it to the publisher, as proof that the item was not sold. More generally, reverse
logistics must be put in place, and can be expensive for bulky or heavy items, such as
books.
² Revenue sharing agreements, see Cachon and Lariviere [4], induce the same incentive
e®ect. This type of contract stipulates a cost per unit paid from buyer to supplier, plus
a share of the buyer's revenue transferred to the supplier. It is commonly used in the
video rental industry. However, for revenue sharing to be e®ective, the supplier must be
able to monitor the sales of the buyer, of which he receives a share. Obviously, without
monitoring, the buyer would rather declare a very low revenue so that the payment to
the supplier is reduced. For example, in 2000, see [15], the sales monitoring company
Rentrak brought Hollywood Entertainment, the second largest video store chain in the
United States at the time, to court, for understating sales. The understatement would
have reduced the revenue sharing payments from Hollywood to Rentrak. Hollywood ended
up paying $14m to Rentrak. We can thus see that, to enforce revenue sharing agreements,
either partners must trust each other, or otherwise information technology investments
must be installed, at high cost.
2² Finally, capacity pre-commitments, see Barnes-Schuster et al. [1] and Mart¶ ³nez-de-Alb¶ eniz
and Simchi-Levi [12], are used in high-tech and fashion clothing manufacturing. Under
such contracts, the manufacturer requires advance capacity reservation from the retailer,
which is charged up-front; after accurate forecasts are obtained and ¯nal production quan-
tities adjusted, the ¯nal order is placed by the retailer, up to the reserved capacity, for
an additional execution fee. Selecting the right parameters in these contracts induces the
retailer to order higher quantities, which improves supply chain e±ciency.
We suggest in this paper another simple mechanism to reduce double marginalization, that
uses a wholesale price contract and renegotiation. Our mechanism requires repeated interaction,
and rational behavior from the players, and thus should not involve implementation costs, such
as logistics or information systems. By letting the supplier modify the wholesale price a few
times, we improve supply chain e±ciency.
Speci¯cally, over T rounds of negotiation, the supplier proposes di®erent prices in each
round, and the buyer places orders at the quoted price. Even though prices are decreasing in
time, the buyer places a positive order, to force the supplier to reduce its price in the following
round. This results in higher pro¯ts for both supplier and buyer. Intuitively, this simple
scheme is equivalent to using a non-linear pricing schedule, which is able to reduce double
marginalization. In other words, the e®ects of renegotiation are similar to those of volume
discounts, which push buyers to place larger orders by promising lower prices for the last units
ordered.
Our model uses the same setting as Lariviere and Porteus [10], with multiple negotiation
rounds. That is, we consider a supplier with a given production cost c, that serves the orders
placed by a buyer after the negotiation is ¯nished. This buyer uses the total quantity ordered
to serve a stochastic ¯nal demand D that arrives at the end of the negotiation. The payments
from buyer to supplier are done using a wholesale price contract, with a di®erent price for
each negotiation period. Thus, the buyer maximizes its expected pro¯t given the supplier's
prices, and the supplier maximizes its (deterministic) pro¯t given the buyer's current inventory
position.
Under some regularity conditions on the demand distribution, we show that the supplier
and buyer's problems are well behaved, that price quotes decrease over time and that the
total ordering quantity increases with the negotiation length. Hence, supply chain e±ciency
improves. Finally, we show that as the number of negotiation periods goes to in¯nity, the
supply chain pro¯t converges to the ¯rst-best, i.e., the pro¯t of the centralized supply chain.
In addition, the sub-optimality gap decreases with 1=T. With these results in hand, we discuss
3in the conclusion with a very simple model how the negotiation process should be organized.
The paper contains two main contributions to the literature. First, we provide the supply
chain literature with a scheme to e®ectively improve supply chain e±ciency, as an alternative to
supply contract engineering. The logic of our scheme is quite di®erent from the existing coordi-
nating mechanisms: it is dynamic instead of designed in one shot, statically; it is decentralized,
with both players taking decisions unilaterally without considering the optimal supply chain,
instead of relying on a comparison to the centralized supply chain; and ¯nally, the improvement
is progressive and e±ciency increases with the length of the negotiation.
Second, our model extends previous work from the economics literature on price skimming,
in the case where the buyer is strategic, in a context of supply chain. Strategic customers have
been studied before, but this paper considers the market power of buyers as well. That is, in
our model, the buyer takes into account the impact of its purchasing decisions on future prices,
in contrast with the literature, e.g., Besanko and Winston [2]. In addition, our model can be
used for further extensions with many buyers and many suppliers, where buyers are not only
strategic but can use their market power.
We start by discussing the literature relevant to this work in Section 2, and turn to the
model in Section 3 and an example in Section 4. We present our results in Section 5 and
analyze supply chain e±ciency improvements in Section 6. We conclude the paper in Section
7 with a summary of the insights and further research. All the proofs are contained in the
appendix.
2 Literature Review
This paper directly extends Lariviere and Porteus [10], where the ine±ciencies of double
marginalization are analyzed. Perakis and Roels [14] investigate how serious double marginal-
ization can be. For this purpose, they study the worst-case performance of supply chains,
among all possible demand distributions, by considering the price of anarchy, i.e., the worst-
case ratio between pro¯ts achieved by a decentralized supply chain and a centralized one. They
show that, for the supply chain con¯guration used in this paper (simple push supply chain with
2 stages), as the cost-to-price ratio decreases, supply chain e±ciency worsens, and approaches
zero. The model of Lariviere and Porteus [10] has also been used to examine actions to reduce
double marginalization. Debo and Sun [5] consider a repeated game and investigate when sup-
ply chain collaboration can be sustained. They ¯nd that, when the discount rate for future
pro¯ts is high, it is more di±cult to achieve supply chain collaboration.
Improving supply chain e±ciency is the purpose of the supply contracts literature, which
4focuses on aligning supply chain incentives. Cachon [3] provides an excellent review of the ¯eld.
Pasternack [13], Cachon and Lariviere [4], Barnes-Schuster et al. [1], Eppen and Iyer [7], among
others, present supply contracts that move the supply chain towards better coordination.
Some papers from the revenue management literature are also related to ours, as we study
the pricing problem of the supplier. Talluri and van Ryzin [16] provide an overview of the
literature, and devote one section to price skimming models. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [6]
provide an interesting review of the literature: our work falls into their replenishment/strategic-
customers category, since we have no capacity constraint, and the buyer considers its e®ect on
the supplier's pricing strategy. Lazear [11] develops a model where demand is constant, equal
to one unit, but the buyer's valuation is uncertain and uniformly distributed. The buyer is
myopic, in the sense that he places an order as soon as the price is below its valuation. The
price schedule can thus be described up-front, and decreases over time, so that, in expectation,
more revenue can be extracted from the buyer. Granot et al. [9] extend Lazear's model by
introducing competition between suppliers. Closer to our work is the model of Besanko and
Winston [2], that consider one supplier and many buyers. They introduce the notion of strategic
customers, i.e., when the buyers anticipate price decreases before placing their orders. They
implicitly assume that the buyers have no market power, i.e., their strategy has no impact on
the supplier's price. In contrast, since we consider a single buyer, we take into account how
the buyer's ordering strategy in°uences the supplier's prices. Finally, Erhun et al. [8] describe
a similar model to ours, where one supplier faces one buyer, with the di®erence that in their
model the demand is deterministic and linear with price. Interestingly, they observe, as we do,
that supply chain e±ciency is improved as the negotiation is extended.
3 The Model
We consider a ¯rm, that we call the newsvendor or the buyer, that has a single opportunity
to serve a stochastic demand D. In order to ful¯ll the demand, the newsvendor must install
inventory prior to the demand realization. This inventory can be ordered from a supplier. If
the total order quantity is lower than the demand, then sales are lost; otherwise there is excess
inventory that must be discarded for a low salvage value. We denote by f the p.d.f. of the
demand, and by F its c.d.f. F. Let F = 1 ¡ F. Without loss of generality, let r = 1 be the
per-unit sales revenue and v = 0 the salvage value. Thus, the expected pro¯t of the buyer is
the r times the expected number of units sold, minus the purchasing cost paid to the supplier.
Upstream on the supply chain, the supplier sells to the newsvendor. Let c 2 [0;1] be the
supplier per-unit cost. Its pro¯t is thus the dollar sales to the buyer, minus c times the total
5order quantity placed by the buyer.
The details of the interaction between supplier and buyer go as follows. There are T nego-
tiation stages. In each stage, the supplier proposes a price pt to the buyer, and the buyer buys
qt ¸ 0. t = T corresponds to the ¯rst period, t = T ¡ 1 to the second, and so on until t = 1
the last period where the buyer can place an order. We denote by xt be the cumulative order
of the buyer from period T up to t+1, both included. Thus, we have xT = 0, and x0 the total
quantity purchased through the entire negotiation. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events
and the notation.
Figure 1: Sequence of events.
Buyer and supplier take decisions so as to maximize their respective expected pro¯ts. We
study the sub-game perfect strategies of each player. That is, for each time period t, and state
of the world (i.e., xt), the supplier sets the price pt(xt) that maximizes its pro¯t-to-go given
the buyer's strategy; alternatively, for each t, xt and pt, the buyer purchases qt(pt;xt) that
maximizes its pro¯t-to-go given the supplier's strategy. When T = 1, our model corresponds
to Lariviere and Porteus [10].
Speci¯cally, in order to understand the players' decisions, we denote by Bt(xt) be the maxi-
6mum expected pro¯t that the buyer can achieve with a starting stock of xt at time t, assuming
that both players follow sub-game perfect strategies from t to 1. Clearly,




Similarly, we denote by St(xt) the maximum pro¯t that the supplier receives when the buyer
has a starting stock of xt at time t. We have that S0(x0) = 0, since, when the negotiation is
over, the supplier cannot sell to the buyer anymore.








t(pt;xt) be the order that maximizes the buyer's pro¯t at time t. Note that when Bt¡1
is concave, the optimal policy is to order up to xt¡1, where B0
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From Equation (2), we obtain p¤




this notation, we have
St(xt) = (p¤
t(xt) ¡ c)(x¤
















We observe that the problem's order and price paths depend only on the parameter xt, the
cumulative amount of orders placed before the negotiation stage t. In particular, the supplier
implicitly ¯xes the buyer's order quantity by setting the right price.
Note that for each negotiation stage, Bt(xt) + St(xt) = Bt¡1(xt¡1) + St¡1(xt¡1) ¡ c(xt¡1 ¡
xt) = B0(x0)¡c(x0 ¡xt). Thus, the total supply chain pro¯t only depends on the ¯nal level of
orders x0 and the initial level of stock xt, and not on the payments between buyer and supplier.
4 Example and Intuition
Consider the case of a buyer that faces a stochastic demand uniformly distributed in [0;1].
Consider that the production cost is c = 0. In that case, a centralized supply chain would
install inventory up to the maximum demand, i.e., x = 1. The supply chain pro¯ts would thus
be ED = 0:5.
7In the decentralized supply chain, when there is only one negotiation period, T = 1, the
supplier would set a wholesale of w = 0:5, so that the inventory level installed by the buyer is
x = 0:5. Consequently the pro¯t of the supplier is wx = 0:25, while the expected pro¯t of the
buyer is Eminfx;Dg ¡ wx = 0:125. The total supply chain pro¯ts are thus 0:375, only 75% of
the centralized case.
Consider now the situation where there are two negotiation periods, T = 2, and both players
take their respective optimal decisions. In the ¯rst period, t = 2, the supplier sets a price of
w2 = 0:5625, so that the buyer places an order for q2 = 0:25; in the second period, the supplier
lowers the wholesale price to w1 = 0:375, and the buyer places an additional order for q1 = 0:375.
Thus the total inventory purchased is x = 0:625, which yields pro¯ts of w2q2+w1q1 = 0:28125 >
0:25 for the supplier and Eminfx;Dg¡w2q2 ¡w1q1 = 0:1484375 > 0:125. Thus, both supplier
and buyer win.
One may wonder why the buyer places an order at price w2 > 0:5. Indeed, the buyer can
perfectly anticipate the decrease in price at the next period, t = 1. However, its rational choice
is to purchase q2 > 0: by placing a positive-quantity order, it takes into account that this will
result in a price decrease even larger than if no order was placed. This improves its overall
pro¯ts.
Through the example above, we can see how extending the negotiation length T can bene¯t
both players. In the next section we develop conditions under which the buyer and supplier
problems are well-behaved, and characterize the optimal supplier pricing and buyer purchasing
strategies.
5 The T-periods Negotiation
Clearly, the optimality problems in Equations (1) and (2) have interior unique solutions if and
only if:




² for all t and xt, (B0
t¡1(z) ¡ c)(z ¡ xt) + St¡1(z) is pseudo-concave in z.
It is not clear that these properties are satis¯ed by the recursive Equation (3), in the same
way that the supplier's pro¯t was not necessarily pseudo-concave in Lariviere and Porteus [10].
Some regularity conditions on the demand distribution are necessary for pseudo-concavity to
be preserved in the recursion.








. Let Át such that
Át(x0) = x0 ¡ xt: (4)
Át relates xt, the cumulative order placed from T up to t + 1, to the total order placed from T
to 1, assuming that supplier and buyer follow their optimal strategies from t to 1. Hence, we
have that xt = (id ¡ Át)(x0). In addition, it is clear that Á0 ´ 0.
It turns out that we can rewrite in relatively simple way Bt and St as functions of x0. Let
bt(x0) = Bt ((id ¡ Át)(x0)) and st(x0) = St ((id ¡ Át)(x0)): Working with x0 instead of xt¡1,




¡ pt(x0 ¡ Át¡1(x0) ¡ xt) + bt¡1(x0)
o
: (5)
For the maximization problem to have a unique interior solution, we must have that ¡pt +
ptÁ0
t¡1(x0)+b0
t¡1(x0) = 0 has a unique solution, and is positive before, and negative after that





is decreasing for all x0.
In that case, for each pt, the buyer selects a unique x¤







In particular, u1(x0) = F(x0).




(ut(x0) ¡ c)(x0 ¡ Át¡1(x0) ¡ xt) + st¡1 (x0)
o
: (7)
The theorem below provides the conditions to ensure that both the buyer's and the supplier's
problem have a unique optimal solution, and that both Át and ut are well-de¯ned.
Theorem 1 Á0 ´ 0 and u1 ´ F, and for all t ¸ 1, when ut(x) and Át(x) ¡ x are decreasing
for x < F
¡1(c),











If the recursion is well de¯ned, i.e., for all k · t, Ák(x) ¡ x and uk(x) are decreasing for
x < F
¡1(c), then
² Ák ¸ Ák¡1 and uk ¸ uk¡1;





















where x0 satis¯es Át(x0) = x0 ¡ xt:
The theorem characterizes recursively Át, that allows us to retrieve the optimal control from
the supplier's point of view, and ut, that determines the buyer's response to the supplier's price.
In addition, it relates these to the supplier's and buyer's objective function.
As pointed out above, for the recursion to be well de¯ned, we need the demand distribution,
through F, to satisfy some regularity conditions. As t > 1, it becomes increasingly di±cult to
verify that Át(x)¡x and ut(x) are decreasing. Thus, we develop the following results, that lead
to these regularity conditions.
Theorem 2 Consider Át;ut satisfying Equations (8) and (9).
















Then ¸t and vt satisfy ¸0 ´ 0, v1(p) = p + c, and for all t ¸ 1,











In addition, for all t ¸ 0, Át(x) ¡ x and ut+1(x) are decreasing for x < F
¡1(c) if and only
if ¸t(p) ¡ F
¡1(p + c) and vt+1(p) are increasing for p > 0.
This reformulation simpli¯es the analysis. Indeed, both the cost and the demand distribution






Theorem 1, g must have some regularity properties. Interestingly, this function is related
to the log-concavity of the demand distribution. Indeed, g is concave if and only if f0=f is
non-increasing, i.e., f is log-concave, since




Note that the demand distribution is log-concave for uniform, exponential, gamma or normal
demands, among many others. Next, we solve the recursion of Equations (10) and (11) for
selected demand distributions.
105.1 Uniform demand
Lemma 1 Consider g(p) = apb, with b · 2. Then the solution to the recursive equations (10)
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9
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Notice that the case with b = 0 corresponds to the case of the uniform distribution. The
case b = 1 + 1=¯, with ¯ > 1 corresponds to a Pareto distribution with ¯nite mean, i.e.,
F(q) = (1 + q)¡¯, with c = 0. The case b = 1 corresponds to the exponential distribution with












In addition, Lemma 1 can be used to establish the properties around 0 of the solutions to
Equations (10) and (11) for any demand distribution.
Lemma 2 Let ¸t and vt be the solutions of Equations (10) and (11), with g such that g(0) > 0.



















Lemma 2 characterizes the slope of the function ¸t around 0. This result, as we see in
Section 6, allows us to derive the asymptotic e±ciency of the supply chain for large t.
5.2 Approximation of normal demand






, with a ¸ 0, r ¸ 1 ¡ c. Then the solution to the


























This lemma allows us to use a closed-form formula to approximate the normal distribution.
Indeed, consider a normal distribution of average ¹ and standard deviation ¾, and c = 0. As











. This approximation is very accurate for values around the mean, but has
heavier tails than the normal distribution.











Figure 2: Comparison of the p.d.f. of the normal distribution of mean ¹ = 100 and standard deviation














´2 and g can be approximated by ga(p) =
p(1 ¡ p)
¾a : Lemma 3
hence provides an approximation for the normal distribution for the speci¯c case of c = 0.
5.3 Exponential demand
For an exponential demand, we describe next the solution of the recursion presented in Theorem
2. When F(q) = e¡aq, then g(p) = a(p + c).













t are polynomials. The sequence of polynomials satis¯es the recursion
Q1
0 = 0; Q2
0 = 1; Q3
1 = p; Q4
1 = 1
Q2























































































We present below the ¯rst elements of the sequence.
Q1
1 = p; Q2
1 = p + 1;
Q3
2 = p(p + 1)(2p + 3); Q4
2 = (p + 1)(p + 2)
Q1
2 = p(p + 1)3(3p2 + 12p + 10); Q2
2 = 2(p + 1)5(p + 3);
Q3
3 = 2p(p + 1)9(p + 2)2(6p3 + 40p2 + 75p + 45); Q4
3 = 2(p + 1)9(p + 2)2(2p3 + 15p2 + 33p + 24)
As t grows, we obtain a sequence of polynomials with positive coe±cients. In addition,











non-decreasing. These curves are illustrated in Figure 3.
Lemma 5 Consider g(p) = a(p+b), with a;b ¸ 0. Then the solution to the recursive equations






















This captures the case of the exponential distribution with decay rate a: g(p) = a(p + c).
In addition, we develop below a similar result, Lemma 6, that allows us to use Theorem 1
for a wide class of functions. Namely, we approximate F by exponentials with increasing decay
































Figure 3: Plot of ¸t and vt+1 for t = 1;3;5;7, for g(p) = p + 1 (exponential demand). We observe that ¸t
is increasing concave, and vt increasing convex (c = 0).
rate: in each interval [qi¡1;qi], we have F(q) = fie¡aiqi. This can be done easily for demands
with increasing failure rate.
Lemma 6 Assume that the demand distribution is piecewise exponential, i.e.,
f(q) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
f1a1e¡a1q for 0 · q < q1
f2a2e¡a2q for q1 · q < q2
:::
fKaKe¡aKq for qK¡1 · q < qK
0 for qK · q
with 0 · a1 · ::: · aK, and such that F(qi) = fie¡aiqi for i · K ¡ 1.








































are increasing, then Át(x) ¡ x and ut(x) are decreasing.
6 Supply Chain E±ciency
In this section, we analyze the gains of supply chain e±ciency achieved by extending the length
T of the negotiation. For this purpose, we compare the highest supply chain expected pro¯t,
14achieved by global optimization, to the supply chain expected pro¯t in the decentralized setting,
where buyer and supplier have T negotiation periods before facing the demand.
Let z¤ be the optimal centralized quantity, that achieves global optimization: z¤ is such that
F (z¤) = c. In addition, let SC¤ be the corresponding supply chain pro¯t. We compare z¤ and
SC¤ to zT and SCT, the total ordering quantity and supply chain pro¯t, after T negotiation
rounds. zT satis¯es ÁT(zT) = zT.
Theorem 3 Consider Át and ut de¯ned by Equations (8) and (9). Assume that, for t ¸ 0,




zT = z¤ and lim
T!1
SCT = SC¤:
Thus, the e±ciency of the supply chain improves with the number of negotiation rounds.
In addition, the longer the time horizon, the higher the buyer and the supplier's pro¯ts, and
hence the higher the supply chain pro¯t. Both players bene¯t from extending the negotiation.
This result immediately leads to another question: how fast does the ordering quantity
zT and supply chain pro¯t SCT converge to the optimal z¤ and SC¤? It turns out that the
convergence rate of the ordering quantity is independent of the demand distribution, as long
some regularity conditions are satis¯ed, as shown below.
We consider ¯rst the uniform distribution in [Dmin;Dmax]. Applying Lemma 1 with a =
1
Dmax ¡ Dmin








where z¤ = Dmax ¡
c
a
is the centralized optimal order quantity. The total capacity installed













where ¦ ¼ 3:1416. In addition, the price trajectory proposed by the seller decreases as the







15where ut is the price proposed t periods from the end, when there are T negotiation rounds in











SC¤ ¡ SCT =
Z z¤
zT





















The supply chain loss of optimality thus decreases with 1=T.
The split of pro¯t between supplier and buyer can also be calculated. The supplier's pro¯t




(uk(zT) ¡ c)(Ák(zT) ¡ Ák¡1(zT))
















As a result, when T ! 1, sT(zT) !
2
¦
SC¤. This ratio also appears in Erhun et al. [8],









the maximum gain achieved by the supplier is 4=¦ ¡ 1 ¼ 27:3%. The maximum supply chain
gain is 4=3 ¡ 1 = 33:3%, while the gain by the buyer is (4 ¡ 8=¦) ¡ 1 ¼ 45:6%. The extension
of the negotation thus bene¯ts the buyer more than the supplier, and the supply chain share













Interestingly, the asymptotic behavior of zT and SCT in the general case can be derived from
the uniform demand case. Indeed, Lemma 2 shows that, around z = z¤ (and p = 0 by using the
16transformation proposed in Theorem 2), the functions ¸T and ÁT can be approximated locally
by linear functions. This allows us to derive the following result.
Theorem 4 Consider Át and ut de¯ned by Equations (8) and (9). Assume that f(z¤) > 0 and
that around z¤, f is smooth, i.e., in¯nitely di®erentiable. Assume also that for t ¸ 0, Át(x)¡x






























where ²i(y)=y ! 0 when y ! 0.











, independent of the distribution, and relies only on the fact






. The convergence coe±cient does depend on the demand
distribution.
Theorem 4's convergence results are illustrated by the numerical experiments below. We
examine the improvement of supply chain e±ciency, as a function of the length of the negotiation
horizon. We focus on uniform, exponential, normal and Pareto distributions. Interestingly,
Perakis and Roels [14] show that, when T = 1, the class of Pareto distributions achieves the
worst-case sub-optimality gap. As we show below, this gap is rapidly corrected as T increases.




approximately. Figure 4 (left) shows the decrease of 1 ¡
zT
z¤ . Figure 5 shows how the
sub-optimality gap goes to 0, for several distributions.
Finally, we have compared the share of the supply chain pro¯t going to the buyer. It is
relatively stable, as shown in Figure 6. This implies that the additional pro¯t generated by
extending the negotiation horizon is shared approximately in a proportional manner, according
to the initial split of pro¯t with T = 1.
7 Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we have presented a supply chain model where a buyer faces a stochastic demand,
and must install inventory to serve this demand before it is realized. The inventory can be
ordered from a supplier. Buyer and supplier interact over a multi-period horizon, where, in

























































Figure 4: Evolution of 1 ¡
zT
z¤ (left) and 1 ¡
SCT
SC¤ (right) as a function of T, shown in a log-log scale
plot. We show the results for several demand distributions: the uniform [0,1], the exponential of decay
rate 1, the normal distribution of mean 100 and standard deviation 30, and the Pareto distribution with
F(q) =
1
(1 + q)2. We set c = 0:2. We observe that the log-log slope is approximately ¡1=2 for the left
¯gure, and ¡1 for the right ¯gure.
T = 1 T = 2 T = 5 T = 20
Uniform [0,1] 24:9% 14:0% 6:0% 1:6%
Uniform [5,6] 8:8% 3:3% 1:4% 0:4%
Exponential ¸ = 1 29:8% 15:9% 6:9% 1:7%
Normal ¹ = 100;¾ = 30 23:0% 12:6% 5:8% 1:6%
Normal ¹ = 100;¾ = 50 24:4% 15:9% 7:0% 1:7%
Pareto ¯ = 2 34:6% 15:9% 7:5% 1:7%
Pareto ¯ = 1:1 29:7% 17:2% 7:4% 1:7%
Figure 5: Optimality gap 1¡
SCT
SC¤ , for several demand distributions, and c = 0:2. Note that the gap for the
uniform [5,6] is much smaller than the rest because there z¤ = 5:8, SC¤ = 4:32, and thus
f(z¤)(z¤)2
2SC¤ ¼ 3:89,
relatively high. This is in contrast with the uniform [0,1], where
f(z¤)(z¤)2
2SC¤ = 1:
18T = 1 T = 2 T = 5 T = 20
Uniform [0,1] 33:4% 34:6% 35:6% 36:2%
Uniform [5,6] 0% 2:6% 3:5% 4:2%
Exponential ¸ = 1 37:3% 38:4% 39:3% 40:1%
Normal ¹ = 100;¾ = 30 19:1% 21:6% 23:2% 23:6%
Normal ¹ = 100;¾ = 50 26:9% 25:3% 26:8% 27:4%
Pareto ¯ = 2 36:6% 39:1% 39:6% 41:2%
Pareto ¯ = 1:1 45:4% 44:9% 45:1% 45:4%
Figure 6: Share of supply chain pro¯t going to the buyer, for several demand distributions, and c = 0:2.
each period, the supplier sets a price, and the buyer places an order for that price. The model
is a direct extension to Lariviere and Porteus [10] from single-period to multi-period horizon.
We use the concept of sub-game perfection to de¯ne the optimal pricing (for the supplier)
and purchasing (for the buyer) strategy, given the other player's actions. We ¯nd that, under
some demand regularity conditions, including uniform, approximate normal and exponential
demand, both the supplier's and the buyer's pro¯t maximization problems are well-behaved,
which is new to the literature.
In addition, we show that supply chain e±ciency increases with the length of the negotiation
T. Speci¯cally, we show that the sub-optimality gap between the T-periods negotiation and the
centralized supply chain falls with 1=T, regardless of the demand distribution. Thus, for large
T, the negotiation situation approaches the highest possible e±ciency for the supply chain.
Interestingly, our iterative approach provides an asymptotic coordination mechanism with
a single pro¯t sharing between buyer and supplier. Usually, coordination contracts, such as
buy-back, have a degree of freedom that allows any pro¯t sharing to occur. That is, buy-back
allows for °exibility in the shares of pro¯t gained by buyer and supplier. However, this also
complicates the design of the contract, since the degree of freedom can lead to disagreement
between players. In contrast, our proposed mechanism is more rigid, and, as a consequence,
simpler. It provides a natural sharing of pro¯ts in the supply chain.
Finally, the paper provides some directions to design the negotiation process between the
buyer and the seller. If negotiating is costly, how long the negotiation should last? This question
can be answered using the asymptotic expected supply chain pro¯t, from Theorem 4,





If conducting one additional negotiation round costs ·, then the (approximate) optimal length

















. Hence, if negotiation costs could be
cut by a factor 4, then the negotiation length should be doubled. Thus, our basic model could
potentially be used to study buyer-supplier interactions.
Furthermore, our work presents a number of interesting questions to be explored in the
future.
First, our work focuses on the negotiation between one supplier and one buyer, both strate-
gic. The revenue management literature has studied in a di®erent setting the pricing problem
of one supplier pricing against one buyer with probabilistic willingness-to-pay. Since the sup-
plier maximizes its expected pro¯t, this is equivalent to pricing against in¯nite buyers. This
situation has been studied both for myopic buyers, see Lazear [11], and for strategic customers,
see Besanko and Wilson [2]. Thus, both the one-buyer situation and the in¯nite-buyer situation
have been studied. The n-buyers situation is the immediate extension of this work.
Second, following Granot et al. [9], the extension to the case of multiple suppliers is also
interesting. In that situation, the buyer faces the trade-o® between placing orders in the
beginning, at a higher price, so that suppliers can o®er lower prices, or wait for the suppliers to
compete and reduce prices. This new trade-o® may change the suppliers' behavior, compared
to our model.
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21Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove the theorem for each t. First (buyer), as mentioned before the theorem, the
buyer's problem is well-behaved when ut is decreasing.












x0 ¡ Át¡1(x0) ¡ xt
´
= 0 (16)
has a unique solution; and the left-hand side is positive before, and negative after that solution.
Noting that bt(x0)+st(x0) = B0(x0)¡c(x0 ¡xt) =
Z x0
0
F ¡cÁt(x0), we have that b0
t(x0)+
s0
t(x0) = F(x0) ¡ cÁ0
t(x0); and Equation (16) can be rewritten as
F(x0) ¡ c + u0
t(x0)
³
x0 ¡ Át¡1(x0) ¡ xt
´
= 0





does not increase more than x0, i.e., its slope is no larger than 1. In that case, we have





This explains Equation (8).
Finally, we can rewrite the buyer's pro¯t, i.e., bt(x0):






















Equation (9). The recursion given by Equation (17) completes the theorem. Note that the
recursion (and hence the proof) is well-behaved if Át(x) ¡ x and ut(x) are decreasing, the
required condition.
22Proof of Theorem 2
















































Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We can verify easily that the recursion given by Equations (10) and (11) is satis¯ed
by ¸t = ¸tp1¡b and vt = vtp + c, where ¸0 = 0;v1 = 1 and for t ¸ 1,
¸t = ¸t¡1 +
1
avt
; vt+1 = vt +
1
1 + a(1 ¡ b)¸t
:
The coe±cients ¸t and vt can be found observing that
µ






















Thus, using the initial conditions at t = 0, we have that
µ









(2 ¡ b)t + 1
a(1 ¡ b)¸t + 1
: (18)
In addition, substituting this in the recursion for ¸t yields
¸t = ¸t¡1 +
(1 ¡ b)¸t¡1 +
1
a
(2 ¡ b)t ¡ 1 + b
:
Thus,




























> > > > > <






(2 ¡ b)k ¡ 1 + b
¡ 1
9
> > > > > =





> > > > > <






(2 ¡ b)k + 1
¡ 1
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
:
Substituting this expression in Equation (18) yields
vt+1 =
n
(2 ¡ b)t + 1
o
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
t¡1 Y
k=1





> > > > > =









Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The recursion around p = 0 yields
















which results on the recursion used in Lemma 1 with b = 0, i.e., ¸0
t(0) = ¸t and v0
t(0) = vt:
Proof of Lemma 3












































































































































































Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. From Theorem 1, we have that Át and ut are increasing in t. Thus, the solution to
ÁT(x) = x, that characterizes x0 after T negotiation rounds, is increasing in T. As a result,
SCT = bT(x0) + sT(x0) =
Z x0
0
F ¡ cx0 also increases in T.
Finally, as a function of T, x0 increases but cannot grow larger than z¤, since pT > c always.
As a result, it converges to a ¯nite limit. This limit z can be calculated from the recursion: it
satis¯es Equation (8) taken for large t, where Át(z) = Át¡1(z) = z:





which can only hold when F(z) ¡ c = 0, i.e., z = z¤.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Assuming that f is su±ciently smooth around z¤, e.g., when it is in¯nitely di®erentiable










25where ²i denote functions such that ²i(t)=t ! 0 when t ! 0. Using the reverse transformation







(z¤ ¡ z) + ²Á (z¤ ¡ z):














This yields the result for z¤ ¡ zT. The approximation of SC¤ ¡ SCT follows from
SC¤ ¡ SCT =
Z z¤
zT
(t ¡ zT)f(t)dt =
f(z¤)(z¤ ¡ zT)2
2
+ ²SC
³
(z¤ ¡ zT)2
´
:
26